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Since 2007 the world experiences dramatic swings in internationally traded food commodity 
prices. Within the period of five years, food markets, and especially grains, have experienced 
a number of price surges. In June 2008, December 2010 and, more recently in the autumn of 
2012, food prices increased sharply and subsequently declined for their peak, only to remain 
at relatively high levels, as compared with the 2005-2006 average. 
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Food prices are inherently volatile and addressing the consequences of such volatility is one 
of the most challenging issues facing policy makers, especially in developing countries. Since 
Gustafson’s (1958) price behavior model for a storable staple, over 50 years of empirical 
analysis have added a lot to our knowledge on the behavior of commodity and food prices. 
Unrelated commodity prices move together (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1990); they are highly 
autocorrelated and significantly volatile (Deaton and Laroque, 1992). Their long run 
downward trend (Grilli and Yang, 1988) is subject to violent upward spikes which are not 
matched by the few, or no downward spikes (Deaton and Laroque, 1992). The shocks that 
generate these spikes tend to have a persistence effect on prices over the years (Cashin et al., 
2000), while at the same time. Finally, with regard to causes of commodity prices following 
cyclical patterns, there is little evidence that such cyclical patterns are determined by business 
cycles (Cashin et al., 2002). 
In spite of what we have learned about commodity price behavior during the last 50 years, the 
2008 commodities price episode revealed a gap in our knowledge on the drivers that 
determine commodity, and especially food prices. Since 2005 real food prices exhibit an 
upward trend, and in mid-2008 they increased in a violent surge by more than 60 percent, as 
compared to the 2007 levels. Since then food prices remain at a level significantly higher than  
the average of the 2000-2005 period and  exhibit large fluctuations, with slums followed 
closely by booms in 2009, 2010 and 2012 as shown in Figure 1 which depicts the FAO Food 
Price Index. Indeed, the evidence so far suggests that volatility is both persistent and 
increasing (FAO, 2011; Rapsomanikis, 2011) with the macroeconomic environment and 
climatic shocks generating wide price movements.  
Persistent food price volatility can have significant effects, especially on developing 
countries. In the short run, for net food importing developing countries price shocks can 
negatively affect the balance of payments, foreign currency reserves and worsen the ability to 
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implement social safety programs. In the longer run, the diversification of activities to 
minimize exposure to price risk, inhibits efficiency gains from specialization in production 
and hinders the development of the agricultural sector (Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002). 
Income risks may also blunt the adoption of technologies necessary for agricultural 
production efficiency, as producers may decide to apply less productive technologies in 
exchange for greater stability (Larson and Plessman, 2002). 
The violent spells of food price volatility in world food prices strengthened the attention of 
policy makers to agriculture and fuelled the debate about the future reliability of world 
markets as a source for food. They have also generated a wide array of opinions concerning 
their nature and drivers, and have led to an equally wide array of policy proposals among 
policy makers. At the heart of the debate lies the question of whether such price surges are 
generated by the market fundamentals – the forces of food demand and supply, or by other 
drivers such as trend-following behavior in both physical and financial markets.  
The debate on whether the drivers of food price volatility go beyond market fundamentals is 
reflected on the wide range of the policies proposed. Investing to accelerate agricultural 
productivity growth to meet increasingly stronger demand for food and ease the pressure on 
prices (FAO, 2011) is a proposal founded on the understanding that supply, demand and 
stocks are the relevant drivers of volatility. Proposals such as the establishment of ‘virtual 
funds’ to intervene in the food futures markets by executing a number of progressive short 
sales are based on the surmise that changes in supply and demand fundamentals cannot fully 
explain volatility and speculation, especially in the futures markets, plays an important role in 
determining price movements (von Braun and Torero, 2009). There is no consensus between 
economists on the nature and drivers of food price volatility and, unsurprisingly, between 
policy makers on the policies to mitigate it.  
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In sum, the debate centers on whether agricultural and food prices experienced a ‘rational 
bubble’, which as in the finance literature reconciles trend-following behavior with rational 
expectations on future earnings. Stiglitz (1990) presents a straightforward definition of a 
bubble: if the reason that the price is high today is only because investors believe that the 
selling price will be high tomorrow – when fundamental factors do not seem to justify such a 
price – then a bubble exists (Stiglitz, 1990, p. 13). 
A number of tests and dating algorithms have been developed and used to identify rapid 
increases in prices followed by a collapse, also known as explosive bubbles (Phillips, Wu and 
Yu, 2011; Phillips, Shi and Yu, 2012; Gilbert, 2009; Gutierrez, forthcoming). Previous 
analysis on agriculture commodities by Gilbert (2009) and Gutierrez (forthcoming) applied 
the tests developed by Phillips, Wu and Yu (2011) and focused on four agricultural 
commodities. In contrast, We apply the more recent generalized sup augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(GSADF) test for explosive bubbles (Phillips, Shi and Yu, 2012) to monthly time-series for 
food, beverages, agricultural raw material, cereals, dairy, meat, oils and sugar indices and a 
total of 28 agricultural commodities between 1980-2012. We found price bubbles occurred for 
some commodities within food markets. 
The Debate  
Assessing the extent to which prices reflect fundamental values or not is difficult. It entails 
testing the validity of the present value model. If this fails, the question whether one can 
separate bubble behavior for the possibility that the model itself is misspecified. With such 
difficulties, examining the evidence in an indirect manner, such as exploring both 
fundamental and non-fundamental factors and reconciling their movements with price 
variation, consists of an approach often encountered in the agricultural economics literature.  
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A number of authors underline the importance of the fundamental forces of supply and 
demand in explaining the food prices surges of 2008 and 2010. Growing population and 
income in emerging and developing countries adds significantly to the demand for food, while 
the rate of growth of agricultural production has not kept pace with demand (Alston et al., 
2010; Bioversity et al., 2012). This alone is sufficient to exert pressure on commodity prices. 
The growing demand for food and feed crops for the production of biofuels is another 
significant factor, resulting in food and energy markets being integrated (Serra, et al., 2010; 
Balcombe and Rapsomanikis, 2008). Very inelastic derived demand for maize by the biofuel 
sector contributes to both higher prices and greater price volatility (Abbott, forthcoming). A 
response to the strong demand for grains due to high income growth and biofuels mandates is 
the decline of aggregate grain stocks relative to utilization. Indeed, the global grain market 
stocks-to-utilization ratio has been fluctuating at a low point since 2005-06, signifying a 
reduction in the buffer capacity of the global market. Even small supply and demand shocks 
as well as trade policies can generate wide price variations (Wright, 2010). Wright (2010) 
encapsulates the above strand of literature based on the competitive storage model, and 
concludes that the balance between consumption, available supply and stocks is sufficient to 
justify the recent wide grain price movements. 
Beyond market fundamentals, dramatic increases in commodity futures investments by 
financial institutions coincided with the 2008 food price surge, giving rise to questions on 
whether the forces of demand and supply alone are sufficient to explain such price 
developments. While most of the speculative capital is invested in non-agricultural, especially 
energy futures, investments in agricultural futures, reflected by market open interest,
1
 marked 
a significant increase from 2007 to 2008, a period with rapid increases in food prices, 
especially for maize, soybeans and wheat. Once again in 2010, although increases in the 
                                                 
1
 Open market interest is a calculation of the number of active trades for a particular market calculated using 
futures and options contracts. 
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global market price of wheat were triggered by market fundamentals – reduced supply from 
Russia and the black Sea region due to drought and export restrictions, open market interest in 
commodity exchanges increased significantly. 
Robles et al. (2009) stress that, along with market fundamentals, rising expectations, 
speculation, hoarding, and hysteria played a significant role in the increasing level and 
volatility of food prices,  attributing the 2008 food price episode partly to ‘speculative 
bubbles’. UNCTAD (2011), in the similar line, lay emphasis on the ‘financialization’ of 
commodities, a term which implies that the activities of ‘non-commercial’ financial 
participants tend to drive commodity prices away from levels justified by market 
fundamentals. Non-commercial investors do not engage in physical markets, as commercial 
investors do. The latter include producers and processors who hedge price risks, while the 
former view commodity futures as assets exhibiting relatively high returns which are 
negatively correlated with those from other assets, such as equities and bonds, providing 
effective portfolio diversification. However, these non-commercial investors are far from 
homogeneous and their behavior in the market differs. Commodity index funds form the 
majority of financial investors on commodity futures and follow a passive positive-feedback 
strategy: they identify a trend and take a long position, purchasing commodity futures, when 
the trend is positive and vice versa. Hedge funds follow discretionary trading strategies: they 
adjust their investments in commodity futures in line with changes in asset prices to stabilize 
and diversify their portfolio (Gilbert, 2010; UNCTAD, 2011). The concern is whether these 
non-commercial investors and their trend following behavior feed price bubbles, thus 
detaching both prices from their market fundamental values, and inevitably, the test for 
speculative bubbles becomes an investigation of the impact of non commercial traders on 
futures prices. Such an impact would be also reflected in the physical markets, as the 
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information flow runs from futures to spot markets (Hernadez and Torero, 2010), thus 
distorting price signals.  
Friedman’s (1953) theory on efficient markets underlines that, given rational behavior and 
rational expectations, the price of an asset will always reflect market fundamentals. Any 
divergence of the price from its market fundamental value, caused by non informed traders, 
can be eliminated as it provides an opportunity to informed traders to trade against non-
informed ones, make profit, and bring the price back to its fundamental value. Nevertheless, 
divergences may occur and although short-lived, can be frequent. There are many empirical 
exceptions to the theory of efficient markets. For example, informed traders may choose to 
follow positive-feedback trading strategies. If they expected prices to continue rising, they 
will chase the trend in the short run, thus feeding the bubble, instead of alleviating it (de Long 
et al., 1990). DeMarzo et al. (2008) point out that even rational and informed traders may 
choose to join trend-chasing due to the risk underlying trading against the majority of 
participants. Dass, et al. (2008) focus on the incentives fund managers have to trend-chase, as 
they are assessed against the performance of other fund managers. This provides strong 
incentives for herding and accentuating a bubble.  
In the debate of whether agricultural and food commodity prices are unjustifiably volatile and 
detached from market fundamentals, the agricultural economics literature has mainly centred 
on analyzing whether the 2008 dramatic food price increases were induced by speculative 
purchases of futures contracts by non-commercial institutional investors on prices. These 
analyses do not constitute tests for the detection of a bubble, but focus on identifying the 
possible avenues through which positive-feedback strategies in commodity exchanges 
contributed towards price increases that could not be explained by market fundamentals. 
Nevertheless, in these analyses the term ‘bubble’ is used liberally.  
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Irwin et al. (2009) assess the impact of speculative purchases of food commodity futures by 
index funds on futures prices by means of Granger causality tests and conclude that the 
argument that speculators caused the food price bubble does not hold. Sanders and Irwin 
(2010) investigate the effect of index funds’ positions on the prices of a number of 
agricultural and food commodities, finding no impact when quarterly and monthly data were 
used, and only weak evidence when weekly data was analyzed. They concluded that, overall, 
the evidence that non-commercial investors with passive strategies affect agricultural futures 
prices is scant. Sanders and Irwin (2011) find little evidence of an index-induced food price 
bubble for a number of markets with the exception of soybeans.  
Gilbert (2010) assesses the impact of an index of futures positions in twelve major 
agricultural futures markets on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Food Price Index, in 
addition to the impact of other variables such as the price of oil, money supply and the US 
exchange rate. He concludes that index fund investment is sufficiently large to influence food 
prices. , In another paper, Gilbert (2010) formally tests for a bubble in three food 
commodities, maize, wheat and soybean, using futures prices and applying the methodology 
of Phillips, Wu and Yu (2011). He finds clear evidence for a bubble in soybean prices in 
December 2009 and in January 2009, but no evidence for explosive behavior in the wheat and 
maize prices. Gilbert (2010) finding concurs with that of Sanders and Irwin (2011) on the role 
of index funds in this market, but the interpretation of such results is not easy. First, the 
question relates to the avenue through which non commercial investment behavior would 
generate a price surge.  Gilbert (2010) notes that an increase in the demand for futures 
contracts will tend to raise long-dated futures prices and increase inventory demand, which in 
the short term will result to an increase in the cash price. Recently, Gutierrez (forthcoming) 
found speculative bubbles for wheat corn and rough rice prices and minor evidence for soya 
bean prices. Such differences, as pointed out by Gutierrez (forthcoming), may be due to 
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differences in the bootstrap method used and differences in the method used to define the 
critical values. 
Theory 
Among the potential analytical frameworks for explosive price behaviour, the most widely 
applied are models with rational bubbles which can be illustrated on the basis of the present 
value model. We follow Pindyck’s (1993) application of the present value model on rational 
commodity pricing, where the price of a commodity    is determined by the stream of current 
and expected future payoffs    . Pindyck (1993) draws an analogy with the rational pricing 
of assets, such as stocks, and underlines that for a storable commodity the stream of payoffs 
     is the convenience yield accruing to the owner of the inventory in terms of benefits 
related to the facilitation of processing, sales and the avoidance stock-outs. The convenience 
yield that accrues to the owner of the inventory is directly analogous to the dividend on a 
stock. Therefore, the standard arbitrage condition becomes: 
     [
 
(   )
(         )]    (1) 
where    denotes the discount rate and E is the expectation operator conditional on 
information at time t. For equation (1) to hold, stocks should be positive and no stock-outs 
occur in contrast to the competitive storage model (Gustafson, 1958; Deaton and Laroque, 
1992) where stock-outs play a central role in determining commodity prices in the absence of 
the convenience yield. The forward iteration of the difference equation (1) results in: 
     [∑
 
(   ) 
(    )
   
   ]    [
 
(   )   
  ]  (2) 
Equation (2) suggests that the equilibrium commodity price has two components: (i) a market 
fundamental component, the first term in the right hand side, which is the discounted value of 
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the expected future convenience yields; and, (ii) a bubble component, the second term in the 
right hand side, which is the expected capital gains, or discounted resale value. The presence 
of the bubble, although it reflects that the price of the commodity can exceed its fundamental 
value, is entirely consistent with rational expectations; however, it gives an infinite number of 
solutions for the price, hence the term ‘rational bubble’. For example, as Shiller (1978) 
suggests, a rational bubble could start at any time and, as in the specification of Blanchard and 
Watson, could burst and restart repeatedly. It also echoes Keynes’ thoughts on investors who 
forecast the yield over the life of the asset and speculators who forecast the psychology of the 
market: if agents believe that the selling price of a commodity will be high in the future, then 
it will not be only the fundamentals that will determine the current price, but also the expected 
capital gains. 
Typically, in order to obtain a unique solution, the bubble component, that is the discounted 
value of the commodity, is normally assumed to converge to zero in the indefinite future. This 
is the transversality condition which rules out rational bubbles on the basis of a general 
equilibrium zero-sum argument (Tirole, 1982): the purchase of one unit of the commodity 
would make an infinitely lived agent worse off, as her utility would increase only by the 
fundamental component, that is the discounted value of the expected future convenience 
yields. In other words, no one would be willing to buy an over-priced commodity.  
If the transversality condition holds, equation (2) reflects that the price is determined by the 
discounted value of the expected future convenience yields, giving rise to the standard present 
value model for commodities, as in Pindyck (1993). This model underlines the importance of 
the convenience yield reflecting the fundamental market forces: expectations on changes in 
supply and demand cause changes in the expected convenience yields, rendering the present 
value model a parsimonious and reduced form of a dynamic supply and demand system. 
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In spite of ruling bubbles out, many observers believe that bubbles exist and the literature 
treats such non-fundamental bubbles as possible within an empirical context. The possibility 
that bubbles could exist was stressed by Stiglitz (1990) who questioned that the transversality 
condition could be satisfied with agents that are not infinitely-lived and market institutions 
that do not support infinite planning, such as future markets extending infinitely into the 
future. More recently, Wang and Wen (2012) also show that, given incomplete financial 
markets and borrowing constraints, any inelastically supplied storable good can support a 
bubble, which can serve even infinitely-lived agents as a liquid asset. 
Without imposing the transversality condition, any of the infinite solutions for the commodity 
price can be written as: 
        , 
where      [∑
 
(   ) 
(    )
   
   ] and       [
 
(   )
    ].  (3) 
The statistical properties of     are determined by those of     and    . For example, if    is an 
I(1) process,    , the discounted future stream of expected convenience yields is also an I(1). 
The relation    is an empirical expression which embodies an explosive property and 
introduces ‘bubble’ movements in the price     over the fundamental component   . In the 
absence of bubbles,     , a special case of (3), the current price of the commodity is 
determined according to market fundamentals is when, yielding the standard present value 
model with      , and if      is I(1), current prices are also I(1). If     , current prices 
will exhibit explosive behaviour, as    reflects a submartingale process, that is a stochastic 
process in which the expected value of next period's value, as forecast on the basis of the 
current period's information, is greater than or equal to the current period's value.  
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Given the different stochastic properties of the fundamental and the bubble components, early 
tests for explosive behaviour in asset prices were based on standard Dickey-Fuller tests. As a 
series’ explosive behaviour is still prevalent after differencing, Diba and Grossman (1988) 
tested both stock prices and dividends for nonstationarity. Evidence of stationarity after 
differencing was taken as providing no support for the existence of a bubble, while, 
cointegration between stock and dividends would support the conclusion that stock prices did 
not diverege from their fundamental values. Evans (1991) criticised this integration-based 
approach, stressing that unit root and non cointegration tests are not effective in making a 
distinction between a unit root or a stationary autoregression and a process which exhibits 
periodically collapsing bubble behaviour. The recursive tests proposed by Phillips, Wu and 
Yu (2011) are not subject to this criticism, being effective in distinguishing unit root 
processes from periodically collapsing bubbles and date-stamping their origin and collapse. 
Their methodology is based on a repeated application of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
(ADF), estimating through a recursive regression the specification: 
                ∑    
  
                   (     
 ) (4) 
where    is the logged price of the commodity studies at time  ;       are parameters to be 
estimated;    is the sample window size; and,   is the lag order.  The recursive regression 
involves the estimation of  (4) by least squares starting with       fraction of the sample, 
and repeatedly expanding the sample forward, with the last regression utilising the full sample 
T. For example, the first regression utilises a subsample    [   ] from the first observation 
of the sample to the     observation, selected to ensure estimation efficiency. This produces 
an ADF statistic denoted      . The second regression expands the sample by one 
observation to the  (   )   observation, utilising a subsample     [   ] and producing an 
ADF statistic denoted by      . Subsequent regressions expand the sample window size   , 
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from    to 1, with 1 being the whole sample and      corresponding to the whole sample 
ADF statistic. Phillips, Wu and Yu (2011) by expanding the sample forward, generate a 
sample of ADF statistics and test the null hypothesis of a unit root against the right-tailed 
alternative of explosive behaviour with the supremum  ADF,         [    ]
   
, utilising the 
critical values.  
Although the sup ADF detects periodically collapsing bubbles, date stamping its origination 
and subsequent collapse, Phillips, Shi and Yu (2012) underlined its weakness when there are 
multiple bubble episodes within the same sample period, a condition characterising food 
commodity prices since 2007.   
Econometric analysis of explosive processes using sup ADF has been conducted mainly in 
financial research (Phillips, Wu and Yu, 2011). sup ADF differs from the GSADF in that the 
former uses a fixed initialisation window whereas the latter uses a moving window, which 
avoids results being sensitive to sample start data. Also, the GSADF does allow for the 
possibility of periodically collapsing bubbles (Phillips, Wu and Yu, 2011). 
We use the generalised version of the sup augmented Dickey-Fuller (GSADF) test recently 
developed by Phillips, Shi and Yu (2012), which has not been applied using agricultural 
prices, to test for bubble phenomena. This test is characterised by its ability to deal with 
multiple bubbles (Phillips, Shi and Yu, 2012). The first order Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
regression model used by Phillips, Shi and Yu (2012) is 
                      ∑       
  
             (5) 
Following the GSADF approach by Phillips, Shi and Yu (2012) we allow for variable window 
widths in the recursive regressions. This allows the starting points    to change within a 
feasible range. The standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests the null hypothesis of 
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non-stationarity             against the alternative hypothesis             which implies 
explosive behaviour. Significant ADF test statistics indicate a bubble episode. The estimated 
parameters       of model (5) are obtained through recursive ordinary least squares (OLS)2. 
The idea behind is that if an explosive behaviour exists this will be present over a subsample 
[     ] of the entire sample [   ]. 
Phillips, Shi and Yu (2012) provide critical values of GSADF tests against an explosive 
behaviour. These critical values were obtained setting the lag order to be zero (i.e. zero lags). 
We obtained the asymptotic 90, 95 and 99% critical values for lag orders set from 0 to 12 by 
numerical simulations, where, as in Phillips, Shi and Yu (2012), the Wiener process is 
approximated by partial sums of 2,000 independent (   ) variates and the number of 
replications is 2,000. For our empirical application we set the smallest sample window 
       . The asymptotic critical values obtained are shown in the Appendix. 
Data 
We apply the most recent methodological development in identifying price bubbles by 
Phillips, Shi and Yu (2012) to examine whether recent increase in agricultural prices can be 
categorised as price bubbles (i.e. strong deviations from their intrinsic values). We analyse 
price indexes for food and beverage and agricultural raw materials as well as 28 individual 
agriculture commodity prices (see appendix for list of price definitions). 
We use monthly price indices data from the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAO), as well as from International Monetary Fund (IMF).  The FAO indices 
include the food price index, as well as indices for meat, dairy, cereals, oils and sugar from 
January 1990 to August 2012 comprising 271 observations for each index. We examine the 
IMF indices that include which include the food and beverage index, and indices for food, 
                                                 
2
 We use 10% of the total sample as the starting sample. 
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beverages and agricultural raw materials from January 1980 and February 2012 comprising 
386 observations. 
Data on the 28 individual agricultural commodity prices are collected from the International 
Financial Statistics of the IMF from January 1980 and February 2012 and deflated using the 
US monthly CPI obtained from the US Department of Labour.  
Results 
We follow the approach by Phillips, Shi and Yu (2012) and apply the generalised version of 
the supremum ADF to test for multiple bubble phenomena in food and agricultural raw 
materials prices. We estimate equation (4) allowing for variable window widths in the 
recursive regressions. Phillips, Shi and Yu (2012) provide critical values of GSADF tests 
against an explosive behaviour using Monte Carlo simulations, setting the lag order to be zero 
(i.e. zero lags). We obtained the asymptotic 90, 95 and 99% critical values for lag orders set 
from 0 to 12. As in Phillips, Shi and Yu (2012), the Wiener process is approximated by partial 
sums of 2,000 independent N(0,1) variates and the number of replications is 2,000. For our 
empirical application we use 10% of the sample, as our initial start-up sample,    =0.1,  and 
set the smallest sample window        . The asymptotic critical values obtained are shown 
in the Appendix. 
Table 1 shows the maximum ADF test obtained from estimating the GSADF model (4) 
repeatedly over the feasible ranges    and   . Maximum values greater than the critical 
values reported show evidence of bubble behaviour in the particular index or price as the tests 
reject the null hypothesis        
     in favour of the right tailed alternative hypothesis 
      
    . The tests provide evidence for bubble behaviour at the 10% significance level for 
the both the FAO and IMF food price indices, the IMF food and beverage price index, the 
FAO cereals, dairy and oils indices, and the prices of wheat, rice, soybean oil, rapeseed oil, 
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sugar and coffee. In order to date-stamp the origin and conclusion of the explosive behaviour 
in the series we plot the relevant recursive      
  statistics (Figure 2).  
Our results show bubble behaviour during the end of 2007 and the first months of 2008 in six 
out of the ten indices examined. For the FAO food price index, the evidence suggests 
persistent explosive behaviour from August 2007 until June 2008, while the IMF food and 
food and beverages price indices bubble behaviour is found during January, February and 
March 2008. Within the food and beverage index (IMF) it is possible that the food component 
is the factor behind the bubble behaviour since no explosive behaviour is attributable neither 
to the beverage index nor to any of the individual beverages analysed during the period 2007-
2008.  For the FAO cereals index, there is evidence for bubble behaviour from December 
2007 to April 2008, and for the FAO oils index during February and March 2008. Not entirely 
synchronised explosive behaviour of indices may be attributable to the different aggregation 
and weighting methods. The FAO food price index is trade-weighted and as trade increased at 
a fast rate during the 2007-08 period, the results show persistent bubble behaviour. Amongst 
food commodities the strongest evidence for a price bubble occurring is for rice, for which the 
explosive behaviour lasted for three months, from February 2008 to April 2008, and again in 
July 2008. Prices of wheat, soybean oil and rapeseed oil show bubble behaviour during 
February and March 2008.
3
  
The analysis provides some interesting findings. First, our recursive regressions suggest that 
the price surge of 2007-08 is of a different nature than that of 2010 and 2011, as no evidence 
is found of explosive behaviour in indices and prices outside the period August 2007 to July 
2008. Although in 2010 and 2011, wheat prices surged as a result of climatic factors and 
policies, such as the export ban by Russia in 2010, there is no evidence that prices exceeded 
                                                 
3
 Evidence for bubble behaviour was also found for sugar and robusta coffee, but is unrelated to the recent 
price increases in agricultural commodities prices and therefore is not presented here. 
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their fundamental value.  In sum, we do not detect multiple bubbles in the food price series 
after the summer of 2008, a finding that suggests that since that time, food prices respond to 
the fundamental forces of demand and supply. Second, the analysis suggests that price 
bubbles are relatively short lived. With the exception of the FAO food price index, explosive 
behaviour in food prices lasted for a limited period of time amounting to two, three or, at most 
four months, before collapsing. Thirdly, for the individual commodity prices, the tests provide 
evidence for bubble behaviour in the wheat, rice, soybean oil and rapeseed oil price series all 
of which have exhibited record increases during the first months of 2008 relative to other 
commodities. In their peak, wheat and rice prices were 350 and 530 percent higher, as 
compared to January 2002 levels which could mark the beginning of an upward trend in food 
prices.  
Although our analysis provides answers as to if, and when food prices exhibited bubble 
behaviour, the results raise a number of important questions related to the drivers of explosive 
behaviour. As far as the price of rice is concerned, the results concur with the panic –driven 
trade policy reactions of countries in Asia. Export restrictions, in the form of both taxes and 
bans, beginning during late 2007 were crucial in generating bubble behaviour in the price of 
rice. In late September 2007, Vietnam, the second largest exporter in rice, announced a ban on 
commercial sales. In October 2007, India, the third largest rice exporter, imposed an export 
tax on non-basmati rice and in March 2008 imposed a complete ban in March. These export 
bans, in conjunction with aggressive and panic-driven buying by Philippines, the world’s 
leading importer, during March and April 2008 at prices over US$ 1,100 per tonne, as 
compared to an average of US$ 326 per tonne in 2007, contributed towards the price of rice 
being over-valued, detaching from market fundamentals. 
The results for bubbles in the wheat and vegetable oil prices, though not surprising, are more 
difficult to be interpreted, especially because no explosive behaviour was detected in the 
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prices of maize and oilseeds. At their peak in 2008, soybean oil prices increased by 410 
percent as compared to their January 2002 values, proportionally more than those of soybeans 
which increased by 350 percent. Maize prices also registered a significant increase at their 
peak in 2008 from their January 2002 level by about 300 percent, a rate lower than that of 
wheat prices. For all four commodities, markets were tight in 2007-08: oilseeds and oils 
markets suffered from poor growth and low stocks; in the wheat market, stagnant production 
in conjunction with very low carryover stocks resulted in an extremely tight global market; 
and, maize prices also faced pressure from strong demand from the biofuels industry, 
although the 2007 record crop relatively lessened the strain on the market. 
Beyond fundamentals, even if the GSDAF detects price bubbles, it does not provide sufficient 
evidence that these bubbles are the result of trend-following behaviour in the futures markets. 
Nevertheless, the lack of evidence on explosive behaviour in maize and oilseeds prices 
questions the conjecture that trend-following behaviour in futures markets has been the driver 
of food price increases. Maize and oilseeds futures are traded in commodity exchanges and, 
like wheat, their contracts are included in commodity indices. There are some differences in 
index investments movements across these commodities, but these do not correspond with our 
findings on explosive behaviour. Between December 2007 and June 2008, the index funds’ 
net positions on wheat increased from 38.2% to 41.9% of the total open interest. During the 
same six months period, for maize the share of the index funds net positions was not as 
substantial as that of wheat, but also increased from 25.8% to 27.4% of the total (Gilbert, 
2010). With such a high share of the wheat open interest held by non-commercial traders, in 
an already tight market, the possibility that the demand for long-termed wheat futures 
contracts may have affected prices and generated bubbles through strengthening inventory 
demand, should not be ignored. The size of index funds’ wheat net positions come second 
only to the share of open interest they held on live cattle and lean hogs, which amounted to 
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over 40 percent during 2007-08. In spite of this high share, no bubble is detected in beef and 
pork prices. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that index fund investments would have a direct 
impact on meat markets, through strengthening the demand for inventories (herds) in a period 
of high feed prices. The specificities of each food market, in conjunction with the wide 
diversity of traders, both non commercial and commercial, and their complex trading 
behaviour over a short period of time, makes the analysis of the role of futures markets in the 
2007-08 price episode difficult and beyond the scope of this article. 
Conclusions 
Recently there has been a rise in agriculture products price volatility which has had a wide 
range of implications. A number of tests and dating algorithms have been developed and used 
to identify rapid increases in prices followed by a collapse, also known as explosive bubbles 
(Phillips, Wu and Yu, 2011; Phillips, Shi and Yu, 2012; Gilbert, 2009). We apply the GSADF 
test for explosive bubbles to monthly time-series for food, beverages, agricultural raw 
material, cereals, dairy, meat, oils and sugar indices and a total of 28 agricultural commodities 
between 1980-2012. 
These tests identified that price bubbles occurred for some commodities within food markets. 
Such rapid changes in agricultural commodity prices may have important immediate effects 
on the income and welfare of producers, agents along the food change and consumers as well 
as the trading positions of countries (Balcombe, 2009).  Two important questions arise, a) are 
the price bubbles found in food commodities of speculative origin?; b) are some commodities 
more prone to suffer price bubbles than others 
Looking forward, on question a) there is need for further analysis of trading positions of 
commercial and non commercial participants in the futures markets. A price bubble was 
identified in the wheat market, where the share of open interest was held by non-commercial 
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traders. However, maize, as well as other commodities are traded in futures markets and 
further research based on disaggregated data on the composition of both commercial and non 
commercial positions and their behaviour during price surges is necessary to unravel their 
potential role in determining price movements. Regarding b) specifically we conclude that a 
number of agriculture commodities are prone to suffer price bubbles and therefore efforts in 
both identifying and tackling price bubbles should focus on those commodities that have 
shown bubble behaviour in the past. For example, the global rice market is quite thin, with 
major producers and exporters managing domestic markets through export controls combined 
with buffer stocks. Our results show that export restrictions can exacerbate or even cause 
severe disruption and a collapse in confidence on international markets. Increased 
international trade policy coordination in times of crisis can also reduce volatility and ensure 
that global markets can be still a reliable source of food. Enhanced trade policy harmonization 
through more predictable and less discretionary policies would convey clearer information 
and render panic and hoarding less likely, resulting in less uncertainty. 
From the methodological point of view, an important issue also highlighted by Gilbert (2010) 
is the data frequency (e.g. daily, monthly) used in the analysis may be important in detecting 
bubbles. The fact that we have not found more price bubbles may be precisely because of the 
data frequency used (i.e. using higher frequency data such as daily data may have detected 
bubbles that are disguised under lower frequency data).  
Therefore, high frequency data of agricultural prices, particularly data of commodities that 
have shown bubble behaviour in the past, should be used to detect emerging trends of price 
spikes. Cereals, such as wheat and rice, staple crops, and vegetable oils such as soybean and 
rapeseed oil have shown bubble behaviour in the recent years and close attention should be 
paid to their price evolution.  On the other hand, fruits meat, seafood and to a large extent 
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beverages have not shown evidence of bubble behaviour and therefore the relative risk of 
bubble behaviour may be low. 
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Table 1. GSADF model results for agricultural commodities  
Commodities Max 90% critical 
value  
Lags n 
Index     
Food and beverage index 2.00 1.87 1 254 
Food Index 2.09 1.87 1 254 
Beverages Index 0.88 2.11 1 386 
Agricultural Raw Material 
Index 
1.41 2.11 1 386 
Food Price Index – FAO  3.10 1.93 1 271 
Cereals Price Index – FAO  2.98 1.93 1 271 
Meat Price Index – FAO -0.04 1.93 1 271 
Dairy Price Index – FAO 1.97 1.93 1 271 
Oil Price Index – FAO 2.28 1.93 1 271 
Sugar Price Index – FAO 1.06 1.93 1 271 
Cereals     
Wheat 2.24 2.11 1 386 
Maize 1.13 2.11 1 386 
Rice 4.09 2.29 2 386 
Barley 0.85 2.11 1 386 
Vegetable oils and protein 
meal 
    
Soybean 1.28 2.11 1 386 
Soybean meal 0.68 2.11 1 386 
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Soybean oil 2.60 2.11 1 386 
Palm oil 1.90 2.53 4 386 
Fishmeal 2.01 2.11 1 386 
Sunflower oil 1.11 2.29 2 386 
Olive oil 1.89 2.29 2 386 
Groundnuts (peanuts) 0.80 2.11 1 386 
Rapeseed oil 2.09 1.96 0 386 
Meat     
Beef 1.36 2.29 2 386 
Lamb 0.34 2.29 2 386 
Swine (pork) 1.51 1.96 0 386 
Poultry (chicken) 0.89 2.11 1 386 
Seafood     
Fish (salmon) 0.80 2.71 6 386 
Shrimp 0.00 2.29 2 386 
Sugar     
Sugar, free market 1.56 2.11 1 386 
Sugar, European import price 1.53 1.87 1 254 
Sugar, U.S. import price 3.50 2.11 1 386 
Fruit     
Bananas -1.44 1.96 0 386 
Oranges -0.61 2.11 1 386 
Beverages     
Cocoa beans 2.07 2.29 2 386 
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Coffee, other mild arabicas 1.70 2.11 1 386 
Coffee, Robusta 2.15 2.11 1 386 
Tea 0.38 2.11 1 386 
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Figure 1. FAO Food price index 
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Figure 2 Price trends and GSDAF test statistics 
Food and Beverage index Food index 
  
Beverages index Agricultural raw material index 
  
Food Price Index - FAO Meat Price - FAO 
  
Dairy Price Index - FAO Cereals Price Index - FAO 
  
Oils Price Index - FAO Sugar Price Index - FAO 
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Appendix 
Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 show the critical values at 90, 95 and 99% level, respectively. Tables 
show the critical value by lags (0 to 12) and number of observations (100 to 500). 
 
Table A.1 
 Number of observations 
Number of 
lags 
100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 
0 1.145 1.449 1.593 1.723 1.814 1.892 1.957 2.009 2.045 
1 1.267 1.567 1.753 1.868 1.970 2.028 2.111 2.160 2.208 
2 1.415 1.748 1.926 2.056 2.153 2.236 2.289 2.343 2.384 
3 1.462 1.775 2.004 2.154 2.239 2.331 2.396 2.451 2.501 
4 4.607 1.987 2.159 2.311 2.397 2.473 2.534 2.577 2.631 
5 1.628 1.988 2.210 2.335 2.435 2.539 2.620 2.688 2.728 
6 1.691 2.089 2.317 2.457 2.571 2.678 2.750 2.785 2.841 
7 1.768 2.162 2.382 2.514 2.639 2.733 2.800 1.875 2.930 
8 1.834 2.258 2.502 2.639 2.733 2.834 2.891 2.961 3.024 
9 1.838 2.263 2.465 2.659 2.763 2.855 2.925 2.988 3.051 
10 1.953 2.389 2.613 2.763 2.877 2.962 3.037 3.126 3.182 
11 1.985 2.439 2.671 2.806 2.930 3.046 3.092 3.161 3.220 
12 2.093 2.477 2.749 2.916 3.039 3.132 3.215 3.273 3.325 
 
Table A.2 
 Number of observations 
Number of 
lags 
100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 
0 1.455 1.709 1.863 1.992 2.061 2.140 2.203 2.266 2.308 
1 1.589 1.836 2.039 2.163 2.251 2.310 2.374 2.423 2.458 
2 1.780 2.061 2.209 2.347 2.426 2.520 2.567 2.618 2.662 
3 1.783 2.131 2.331 2.474 2.566 2.649 2.715 2.759 2.789 
4 2.015 2.335 2.496 2.605 2.695 2.765 2.836 2.873 2.923 
5 2.000 2.334 2.517 2.659 2.759 2.852 2.923 2.974 3.003 
6 2.083 2.484 2.664 2.806 2.896 2.992 3.037 3.097 3.138 
7 2.168 2.492 2.735 2.881 2.985 3.058 3.109 3.157 3.185 
8 2.280 2.645 2.874 2.990 3.061 3.144 3.212 3.260 3.317 
9 2.235 2.659 2.869 3.007 3.127 3.218 3.305 3.359 3.418 
10 2.350 2.761 2.970 3.127 3.239 3.311 3.378 3.438 3.490 
11 2.418 2.821 3.008 3.122 3.250 3.349 3.424 3.476 3.514 
12 2.452 2.870 3.103 3.259 3.358 3.445 3.564 3.601 3.654 
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Table A.3 
 
 Number  of observations 
Number of 
lags 
100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 
0 2.048 2.229 2.381 2.493 2.639 2.716 2.766 2.791 2.803 
1 2.160 2.440 2.641 2.738 2.848 2.917 2.968 2.994 3.033 
2 2.484 2.667 2.787 2.916 2.993 3.093 3.173 3.222 3.232 
3 2.488 2.849 3.003 3.059 3.159 3.241 3.281 3.330 3.346 
4 2.751 3.072 3.216 3.254 3.325 3.352 3.431 3.472 3.517 
5 2.778 2.977 3.144 3.281 3.377 3.498 3.539 3.576 3.629 
6 2.885 3.179 3.296 3.424 3.529 3.589 3.660 3.688 3.736 
7 2.972 3.272 3.411 3.539 3.663 3.712 3.786 3.825 3.835 
8 3.061 3.325 3.441 3.559 3.684 3.815 3.829 3.864 3.977 
9 3.084 3.508 3.678 3.788 3.842 3.890 3.994 4.065 4.086 
10 3.225 3.452 3.621 3.752 3.864 3.937 4.025 4.078 4.105 
11 3.088 3.545 3.692 3.811 3.893 3.934 3.957 4.017 4.063 
12 3.253 3.575 3.792 3.937 4.054 4.162 4.243 4.243 4.307 
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List of agriculture commodities price definitions 
1. Bananas, Central American and Ecuador, FOB U.S. Ports, US$ per metric tonne 
2. Barley, Canadian no.1 Western Barley, spot price, US$ per metric tonne 
3. Beef, Australian and New Zealand 85% lean fores, CIF U.S. import price, US cents per 
pound 
4. Cocoa beans, International Cocoa Organization cash price, CIF US and European ports, 
US$ per metric tonne  
5. Coffee, Other Mild Arabicas, International Coffee Organization New York cash price, ex-
dock New York, US cents per pound  
6. Coffee, Robusta, International Coffee Organization New York cash price, ex-dock New 
York, US cents per pound 
7. Rapeseed oil, crude, fob Rotterdam, US$ per metric tonne  
8. Fishmeal, Peru Fish meal/pellets 65% protein, CIF, US$ per metric tonne  
9. Groundnuts (peanuts), 40/50 (40 to 50 count per ounce), cif Argentina, US$ per metric 
tonne 
10. Lamb, frozen carcass Smithfield London, US cents per pound  
11. Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price, US$ per metric tonne 
12. Olive Oil, extra virgin less than 1% free fatty acid, ex-tanker price U.K., US$ per metric 
tonne 
13. Oranges, miscellaneous oranges CIF French import price, US$ per metric tonne  
14. Palm oil, Malaysia Palm Oil Futures (first contract forward) 4-5 percent FFA, US$ per 
metric tonne  
15. Swine (pork), 51-52% lean Hogs, U.S. price, US cents per pound. 
16. Poultry (chicken), Whole bird spot price, Ready-to-cook, whole, iced, Georgia docks, US 
cents per pound 
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17. Rice, 5 percent broken milled white rice, Thailand nominal price quote, US$ per metric 
tonne 
18. Fish (salmon), Farm Bred Norwegian Salmon, export price, US$ per kilogram  
19. Shrimp, No.1 shell-on headless, 26-30 count per pound, Mexican origina, New York port, 
US cents per pound  
20. Soybean Meal, Chicago Soybean Meal Futures (first contract forward) Minimum 48 
percent protein, US$ per metric tonne  
21. Soybean Oil, Chicago Soybean Oil Futures (first contract forward) exchange approved 
grades, US$ per metric tonne  
22. Soybeans, U.S. soybeans, Chicago Soybean futures contract (first contract forward) No. 2 
yellow and par, US$ per metric tone 
23. Sugar, European import price, CIF Europe, US cents per pound 
24. Sugar, Free Market, Coffee Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) contract no.11 nearest 
future position, US cents per pound 
25. Sugar, U.S. import price, contract no.14 nearest futures position, US cents per pound 
(Footnote: No. 14 revised to No. 16) 
26. Sunflower oil, Sunflower Oil, US export price from Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric 
tonne 
27. Tea, Mombasa, Kenya, Auction Price, US cents per kilogram, From July 1998, Kenya 
auctions, Best Pekoe Fannings. Prior, London auctions, c.i.f. U.K. warehouses 
28. Wheat, No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric 
tonne  
